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I. INTRODUCTION 
In many areas, notably the arid portion of the western United 
States, economic development and increased use of both surface and ground 
water supplies has been accompan ied by proliferation of water storage 
facilities. As these reservoirs are filling, rivers become more com-
pletely appropriated and ground water supplies approach depletion more 
rapidly. While the analysis and management of ground water and surface 
water supplies should be integrated, we consi.der surface water iude-
p•·.1dently, thus following the bifurcation in the treatr.ient of ground and 
surface water under exi sting water law.*"' In Burness and Quirk [3] 
we considered the efficiency aspects of the appropriative wate.r rights 
doctrine in the static analogy of an uncontrolled river. Here we follow 
in the spirit of Gessford and Karlin [6) and analyze the optimal aper-
ation of a water storage facility in the presence of downst ream users. 
In addition, we consider alterations in divers ion capacity by water users 
j_n the presence of such a facility. By explicitly considering alter-
native water rights doctrines we are able to conunent on the efficiency 
and stability of prevalent patterns of ownership and operation . 
In the eastern United States water rights have developed according 
to the English conunon law doctrine of riparianism . Under the riparian 
* 
** 
This research was conducted at the Environmental Quality Laboratory at 
Caltech and was supported in part under a grant from the Energy Research 
and Development Administration, No. EY-76-G-03-1305, Caltech Energy 
Research Program. 
For a summary of water law see [12]. 
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doctrine, each property owner fronting on a lake or ·stream has a right to 
the unimpaired use of the waterway , regardless of the location of his 
property along the waterway and regardless of the time at which the 
property is acquired or use made of the waterways. As all r ights are 
equal, strictly speaking the right holder may not dim inish the flow 
of water by physically consuming it, as tfiis would impair the rights of 
other riparians. While courts have held that "reasonable" diversions 
of water by riparian rights holders are permissible, there are still 
severe restrictions on such diversions, coupled with uncertainty as to 
the judicial response to any proposed diversion. Due to the common 
property problems associated with the riparian doctrine and its 
inappropriateness for water scarce areas, we do not consider it 
analytically. Rather we focus on the doctrine of prior appropriation and 
the doctrine of correlative r:ights . 
Under th� appropriative doctrine the right to a certain amount of 
water is established and maintained only through use; depending on· 
state law, rights may be lost by abandonment, forfeiture, prescr iption 
or estoppel. Priority of rights is determined by the chronological 
order in which the rights were obta ined , the earl iest right being the 
most senior.* 
The doctrine of appropriation suffers from several drawbacks. 
For example, under this doctrine an ind ividual can appropriate more 
water than he can presently use in order to provid ·� for his needs in 
* 
For a thorough discussion of the legal aspects of appropriation, 
see [12]. 
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the future when such excess water might be used profitably.* While 
stal;:e water laws l imit appropriations to uses that are "beneficially 
consumptive " in an attempt to preclude methods or types of use wh ich 
are wasteful, there are obvious difficulties in establishing that water 
is being wasted by.a rights holder, so that the protection afford ed 
through restriction of appropriations to beneficial consumptive use 
may be more illusory tha'n real . ** 
However, even when the tenet of beneficial consumptive use is 
strictly adhered to, there are st ill problems with the appropriative 
system. In [3] we show that the doctrine of appropriation leads to 
allocative inefficiencies stemming from the unequal sharing of risk 
among senior and junior appropr iators; we also show, as an application 
of the Coase theorem [4], that the introduction of competitive markets 
in water rights and the use of diversion facilities eliminates these 
inefficiencies. While in principle wa·ter rights could be freely trans-
ferable under the appropriative doct.rine, in practice there are limit-
ations on the transfer and sale of water rights. These rest r ictions 
appply most forceably to a change in type of use or in diversion 
locations, as for example, in the transfer of water rights from 
irrigation to municipal use, or in a transfer of water outside the 
* 
To illustrate, a large western irr igation d istrict loses perhaps 
** 
500,000 acre-feet of water yearly through seepage in an unlined diver­
sion canal, a method of use which could be considered wasteful. As the 
district has established rights to this water, the future lining of the 
canal would make the salvaged water ava ilable to the district. 
However, there are exceptions. Struckmeyer and Butler[l l ] cite a 
California court case in which the use of water during the off-season 
to flood gophers from their holes was consid ered wasteful . 
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property limits of the original rights holder.* Moreover, sale or 
transfer of water involving the removal of water to another state is a 
practical impossibility, at least in the western states. 
Nevertheless, the appropriative doctrine has been widely adopted 
in the west** as it is well suited to the exploitation of a waterway in 
a scenario where water is scarce and the major uses of the waterway 
must involve physical diversions, say for irrigation or for municipal 
or industrial uses. Under such circumstances there are obvious advan-
tages to a system of rights based on the appropriative doctrine. An 
appropriative allocation preserves incentives for investment that might 
be foregone under the riparian scheme due to the common property aspects 
of the latter. Moreover, while the appropriative allocation is not Pareto 
optimal in a steady state equilibrium, such a system of rights is 
necessary for any substantive development to occu� at all. 
* 
An alternative doctrine to that of appropriation is a variant 
of the doctrine of correlative water rights from ground water law. The 
doctrine of correlative rights assigns the owner of land overlying a ground 
water basin rights to water based on the percentage of his land to all 
such overlying land. The variant we employ is that of equal shar.ing, 
'Often such transfers alter the availability, quantity or quality of 
** 
return flows and may impair the rights of previously adjacent appropria­
tors. In 1974, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 
was able to transfer a portion of its rights to Colorado River water 
to the Southern California Edison Company, but only after the passage 
of enabling legislation by the California State Legislature, as the 
So. California Edison intended to use this water outside of the geo­
graphic limits of the MWD .  
Actually the appropriative doctrine is spreading to the Eastern states 
as well, although· for the wrong reasons. See Milliman [9]. 
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in the case of identical downstream firms (users), or prorati
oning, in 
the case that downstream firms might differ.* While equal sh
aring is 
Pareto superior to appropriation (assuming appropriate compe
nsation), 
equal sharing may preclude optimal investment from being und
ertaken 
due to a lack of "tenure certainty"**: the protection of a wa
ter righ t
against the lawful acts of others. For this reason w e  consider t
he 
doctrine of equal sharing only when further entry or exit is pr
ecluded 
or when optimal development of the waterway has previously occ
urred. 
Certainly a doctrine such as appropriation is essential in arriv
ing 
at this juncture. 
Substantial amounts of stored water are supplied by Bureau of 
Reclamation or Corps of Engineer projects. Corps projects �sually con-
tract storage space to water users, who have obtained rights under state 
law, and then impound water and make it available for delivery to those 
individuals. Bureau of Reclamation projects usually acquire the water 
right directly from the state and then wholesale such water to water 
districts which in turn retail the water to users with whom they have 
contracts. This is done at a cost which purports to amortize reimbursable 
construction costs and costs of operation and maintenance. Irrigation 
water 'usually is subsidized, whereas municipal and industrial water 
repay their full prorated share of the cost. Hydroelectric power sales 
' 
amortize project costs not accounted for by the sale of water through 
de�ivery contracts. 
In this paper we consider only the case of identical downstream users. 
For an analysis of non-identical and possibly risk-averse firms in a 
static setting with no storage see [3]. 
' 
See Milliman [ 9] . 
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As we are concerned primarily with efficiency aspects of water use 
and not with issues of equity, we suppose that downstream users own the 
water rights and we abstract from the pricing question. The proper 
costing of storage facilities and pricing of delivered water is the 
subject of ongoing research by the authors. We also ignore the role of 
Federal reserved rights and the possible need for maintaining a minim.um 
"head" for the generation of hydroelectric power ( and the potential cost 
of a deficit), all in an attempt for simplicity. Likewise we recognize 
but do not formally model the public good properties of stored water: 
i. e., scenic, recreational, fish and wildlife, ecological, etc. Given 
these restrictions we can focus on the efficiency aspects of both 
reservoir manager and downstream user behavior. In particular we show 
that equal sharing allocations of a waterway are Pareto superior to 
appropriative allocations (assuming appropriate compensation). Moreover, 
for given aggregate diversion capacity for firms too much water is stored 
in the reservoir under appropriation relative to equal sharing. Once 
the river is completely utilized under appropriation, the introduction 
of competitive markets in water rights generates an equal sharing 
allocation: a Pareto optimum is attainable from an appropriative 
allocation. We also present a theorem on decentralized management for 
equal sharing: independent optimization by reservoir managers and firms 
ultimately leads to simultaneously optimal release policies and diversion 
capacities. 
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Section II considers a finite lived dam under the.equal sharing 
allocation for stochastic river flows while Section III  considers the 
appropriative analogue. Efficiency results are adduced in Section IV 
with the decentralization theorem presented in Section V in the analysis 
of an infinite lived dam. Section VI concludes with some observations 
on optimal investment in dam size and the relationship between investment 
in reservoir capacity and investment in diversion capacity. 
�-i,�-
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II. A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF RESERVO IR MANAGEMENT AND WATER USE 
A. Optimal Release Policy 
We consider the case where a reservoir manager determines an optimal 
release policy so as to maximize the discounted present value of 
expected profits accruing to downstream users. The users are assumed. 
to be risk neutral expected profit maximizers all of whom have identi-
cal profit functions. The number of firms is N which is fixed; the 
fixity of N represents an institutional barrier to entry and exit. 
Unlimited entry can be problematic in that it may lead to incentive in-
compatibility of the equal sharing doctrine at a long run equilibrium* • .
For symmetry we preclude exit as well although exit is not trouble-
some. The presumption of this institutional constraint is not unjustified. 
For example, the Colorado River Compact (1922) limits use of Colorado 
River water in both the upper and lower Colorado River Basins to qne 
half of wha� at that time was thought to be the average annual virgin 
run-off of the Colorado River. In our framework this amounts to 
restricting aggregate rights to water to be equal to the expected value 
of river flows; once N firms have rights which equal expected river 
flows, entry and exit are precluded. Thus we focus on a short run 
equilibrium allocation which, in view of the institutional constraint, 
may become a long run equilibrium under appropriate conditions. 
Each of the N firms is assumed to have a profit function, 
'TT(d,a), where d is deliveries of water received ci.nd a is the 
diversion capacity constructed by each firm. Clearly no firm 
constructs capacity in excess of his right to receive water; 
* 
See Burness and Quirk [3]. 
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and the limitation of beneficial consumptive use precludes the 
user from having rights to water in excess of his ability to divert. 
Thus. the firm's diversion capacity can also be viewed as his rights to 
water. Letting subscripted functions denote partial derivatives, ·we 
require that TI{d,a) � o, TI2(d,a) < o,
·Till (d,a) < 0, TI22(d,a) < o. Moreov�f, 
we assume that div�rsion facilities deteriorate only through aging and 
not by use, so that TI12(a,d) = TI12 = 0. In view of the last assumption, 
the profit function is additively separable so that, TI(d,a) = R(d)-C(a), 
where R and C are revenue and cost functions respectively. Thus 
TI1 (d,a) = Til (d) and TI2(d,a) = TI2(a); we assume that �2(a) = -c < 0 
for simplicity. 
Since a is the diversion capacity of a typical firm, and d , 
deliveries of water, is constrained by d < a, the profit funciton 
w(d,a) and the marginal profit ability of water funtion w1(d,a) appear 
as in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
'TT(d,a) 
w(a,a) 
�������'-'--������������� d 
a 
Figure 2.1. The profit function. 
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i d 
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Figure 2.2. The marginal profitability of water. 
As indicated in Figures 1 and 2, the profit function has a kink 
at d = a, with marginal prof it ability of water positive for d < a, 
and zero for d> a. rr1(a,a) is not defined. When a is fixed, it is 
convenient to use the symbol Ti1 (a,a) to refer to the right hand 
derivative at that point so that Ti1(a,a) =: O. * Note that an implicit 
assumption in this approach is that there are no flood damages possible; 
"excess" flows of water simply bypass users of water. Finally, in most 
of what follows, we will assume that 1r(d,a) satisfies the neoclassical 
condition that lim rr1 (d,a) = + '''. cl-+ 0 
River flows, xt, are stochastically independent and identically 
distributed in every time period with probability dens ity function f (xt).
We consider first a T-period planning horizon. As river flows are also 
inflows into the reservoir, we interpret xt as inflows when there are t
planning periods remaining ; yt represents releases from storage with 
t per iod s remaining; k is the rate at which stocks of stored water evap-
orate (1-k =a); Xt aXt+l + xt - yt is the stock of water with t 
* 
When a is a variable, that is, when firms choose capacities as well as 
water usage, then 1f1(a,a) is treated as lim rr1(d,a). 
�' 
... 1oa,.. 
periods remaining after inflows, rel eases and evaporation. Inflows are 
observed by the dam manager, perhap s  in the form of upstream precipi.ta-
tion or stream gauge readings, at the beginning of each period after 
which reLeases are determined. Thus with t planning periods remaining, 
water available for use is Rt 
of the reservoir is X. 
aXt+l + xt. The maximum storage capacity
In the correlative paradigm all firms share equally any release 
from storage. Consequently, with one p e riod remaining, if re leases are 
y1, then d = y1/N for each firm. The reservoir manager wishes to choose 
y1 such that Nrr(y1/N,a) is maximized subject to 0 � X � X. Let y1* be
the smallest value of y1 such that TI is maximized subj ect to the constraint 
d : a; since firms cannot use more water than they can divert, clearly y1* 
Thus the optimal one period release policy is 
{ 
Rl if R1 :'.: Na 
(2.1) Y1 = y * if Na :'.: R1 < Na + X 1 
R1 - X if R1 :::_Na + X 
and aggregate ontimal profits with one period ·remaining are 
(2. 2) Nrr(y1/N,a) l if R1 > Na 
N11(1\/N,a) if R1 < Na 
N11(y1 */N,a) 
Let 11t(yt' a, Rt) represent expected profits for a typical firm when t 
periods remain, releases are yt ' water available.for d ist ribut ion is 
R
t 
and decisions in the remaining t-1 perio ds are to be made opl 'mally. 
Define 
(2.3) t II (R/N,a) t max _11 (yt,a,Rt) 
O�Rt-yt
�X 
Na 
with rr0 (o) o. Since 111(y1,a,R1)
1 
11(y1/N,a) we have rr (R1/N,a) - 11()\ /N,a) ... 
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Let y2** = y2(y2**+X) be the smallest value of y2 determined by 
(2.10") 1Tl Cyz**/N) - af3E ( Ili (aX+x,a) }N 0 
1 * ** Since rr11 < O, 0Sd <Na, it follows that y� :'.: y�*, hence 0Sy2_sy2 <Na.*
Thus the optimal release policy for the two-period problem is 
R if R ::_ Y2* 
(2.12) Y2 y2(R) ify2*::_R::_y2**+x 
R-X if R > y **+X - 2 
and aggregate optimal expected prof its are 
1 N1T(R/N,a) + NSE Jl· (x/N,a) if R � y2* 
(2.13) N!l2 (R/N,a)=  � N1T(y2/N,a) + Nf3E 1f [a(R-y2)+x,aJ } if y2*::_R::_y2**+X 
N 
R-X { 1 - . } -N1T(N,a) + NSE TI (aX+x,a) if R � y2** + X - N 
while, in view of the fact that dy2/dR = 1 on the first and third· 
intervals and (2.10) holds on the second, 
2 (2.14) n1 (R/N,a)=
1 
NIT1 
(R/N) if R < Y2* 
ai3E { ni [a(R-y2) + x,a] } if y2* ::. R < y2** + x
N N 
1 R-X 
NIT1 CT) if R > y2** + X 
* Further, 0 < y2* < Na implies O < y2* < y�* < Na. 
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and 
1 
N2 1T
ll (R/N) if R<y2* 
2 ' 2 . 1 
'(2.1 5 )  TIU (R/N,a)=\ a SE { 1\1 [a(R-y2) + x,a] } if Y2* ::. R < Y2** + x2 ---N 
1 -- 1T (R-X 
N2 
11 N) if R> y ** + X 2 
so that n2 is continuous and concave, ni and rri1 exist and are continuous, 
except possibly at y2* and Yz** + X.
With t periods remaining the planner chooses y t so a·s to maximize 
t -
N1T (yt,a,R
) subj ect . to 0 ::_ R-yt ::_ X, where 
t { t-1 a(R-yt) +x. 
}
(2.16) 1T (yt,a,R) = 1T(xt/N,a) + SE TI [ N ,a] 
Similar to the two period problem we can show that optimal releases with 
t periods remaining are 
Y, -F�) (2 .17) 
R-X 
if R ::_ yt* 
if y * < R < y ** + X t - - t 
if R > y ** + X t 
- th 
wher e yt* • yt(R ) , and yt** are determined by the t period analogues to 
(2.10'); (2.10), and (2.10") respectively. The analogue to (2.11)
requires that 0 < ay /aR < 1 , for 0 < y < Na. Thus, aggregate optimalt - t -
expected prof its are 

1 
N Trl (R/N) 
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if R < Y�+l
t+l 
(2.34)rr1 (R/N,a) aSE /rr�[a(R-yt+l ) + x,a]) if y�+l � R < Y�tl + X N N 
0 
where 
if R > y** + Xt+l 
l t-1 }(2 . 25) Trl (yt*/N) - aSE rr1 (x/N,a) = 0 
and 
(2.2 6 )  Trl (y�+l/N) -af3E (rr� (x/N,a) } = 0 
Suppose that yt
* 2 Y�+l" Then Trl (yt*/N) ::_ Tr1(y�+l/N) so that 
E {rr� (x/N,a) - IT�-1(x/N,a)) 5 0 in contradiction to hypothesis. Hence 
yt
* ::_ y*t+l' with strict inequality if y�+l <Na. Thus, in view of 
(2.19) and (2.24 ) 
t+l t (2.27)IT1 (R/N,a)-rrl (R/N,a)= 
(o if R < Y�+l 
1"¥ /rr�[a(R-yt+l)+x,a])
N 
� {n:[a(R-Yc+l�+x,o] 
l') if R > Na + X 
1 
- if! l (R/N) 
if Y�+ l 2 R < Y� 
t-1 - \ -rr1 [a (R-yt)+x,a] 1 
N 
if yt* < R < Na+X 
In view of the necessary conditions corresponding to (2.10) and our 
hypothesis, (2.2i') is non-negative with strict inequality for some values 
of R. In addition we have yt+l (R) > yt+Z(R), otherwise 
-18-
t+1 - t ·- I E /rr1 [a(R-yt+2) + x,a] - rr1[a (R-yt+l) + x,a] 2 0, a contradiction. 
These results are summarized in Proposition 2 .1 and depicted in 
F'_gure 2.3. 
Proposition 2.1: Suppose that N firms with identical profit functions 
share equally in the water released from a reservoir with finite cap-
acity and finite life. If the reservoir manager releases water so as to 
maximize expected profit1s of water users, then (t:�
l 
op tun) al release 
policy is given by (2.17). Moreover if X > Na � !__ then y.* > y� , 
s=l as J - J
+l 
Yjt1 =Na and yj(R) � Yj+l (R) for j = l, . . •  ,t+l, with strict inequality 
if YJ+l < Na(yj+l (R) < Na). 
B. Optimal Diversion Capacities 
In the previous section we deduced the optimal policy for releases 
from a reservoir, given the diversion capacities of downstream water 
users. In this section we analyze the response of firms to an announced 
policy for releases. The firm must, in view of the announced policy, 
make a once and for all decision concerning the diversion capacity 
(rights to water) which they desire.· For the time being we maintain 
the fiction that the number of firms is fixed, but relax, if necessary, 
the assumption that the aggregate claims to water cannot exceed the 
expected value of stream flows. More will be said on this in sections 
V and VI. For simplicity we maintain the assumption that X�Na z l
s 
( t-1 )
s=l a: 
so that Yjt1 = Na for j = 1, • . •  , t. We also assume 
that no firm takes into account the effect of its choice of a capacity 
on the policies adopted by the dam manager. 
Expected profits for a representative firm, with t periods remaining 
until the end of the horizon, are, from equation (2.18). 
y 
* 
Y1 '" Na 
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- --- � - ---a-
* 
yt 
* 
Y2 
* 
Y1 '" Na Na(a+
l) 
a 
-( ----
t'-1 
Na i; 1 s
) 
s=l a 
Figure 2.3: Optimal Releases as a Function of Water Available: 
Finite Capacity and Finite L�ved Reservoir, 
R 
(2.28) IT
t
(R/N ; a) = 
-20-
{ t-1 1r(R/N,a) +SE IT (x/N,a) if R:: yt* 
.1rcY/N,a)+SE {ITt-l[a(R-yt)+x,aJl if yt*:::_R:::_y�*+X 
N 
R-X { t-1 - l -'Ir (T,a) + SE IT (a.X+x,a) if R :: yr+xN 
Optimal diversion capacity is determined by differentiating (2.28)
with respect to a and setting the result equal to zero. Performing 
the differentiation yields, recalling that 1r2(a) = -c < 0,
t (2.29) II2(R/N,a) 
d { t-1 
-c + 8 E IT (x/N,a)} da ifR <y * .- t 
t-1 a(R-Yt) +x 
J} -dE{Jt [ N ,a ify *<R<y**+X -c + 8 t - - t da 
dE{ t-l(ax+ x ) }-c + 8 -- N- , a 
da 
if R > y** + X t 
which, upon expanding the expectations is,* 
* 
When the level of diversion capacity a is a variable, then a change 
in a also changes the amount of water diverted d, when the capacity 
constraint is effective . Hence JI�(R/N,a) is to be interpreted as the 
change inlitwhen a is changed, given that d changes together wi t h a 
when the capacity constrain t is effective. Moreover, when a is variable, 
n1(a), and rrf(a,a) exist and generally are non-zero. 
(2. 29') t n2 (R,a)� 
-21-{ y* y** +x t-1 .t:-1 -
t-1 t-1 y -c+S f n2 (x/N,a)dF(x) + }n2 ( �
-1,a)dF(x) + 
0 
fi<O 
t-1 
y
:�� } [n2_ (a,a)+n1 (a,a)]dF(x) if R�.Yt*y** +x t-1 { y* -a(R-y ) y** +x-�(R-y ) t-1 t t-1 - t 
t-1 - •. t-1 yt-1 -c+S fn2 [a(R-yt)+x,a]dF(x) +f n2 (-N�, a)dF(x) + 
0 N y�-1-a(R-}yt) 
m 
t-l t-1 -
f rr2 � (a,a�+ rr1 (a,a)]dF(x) if y�::R::y�*+X
y��1+X-a(R-yt) 
- y** +(1-a)x V�-l -ctX t-1 _ t-1 - t-1 y -c+!3 n2 (�,a)dF(x) + J n2 _ ( �-1 , a)dF(x) +'° y�_1-aX } 
t-1 t-1 -fi n2 (a�
a)+rr1 (a,a)]dF(x) if R�y�*+X 
y** +(1-a)X t-1 
Recalling that n° = 0 and y1* = Na, rr
1(R/N,a) = n(y1/N,a) and �12 = 0
1 imply that rr12 = 0 so that for t = 2, 
(2.30) II� (R/N,a)
-c+S {�+[1-F(Na)]!Ii(a,a)) if R ::y2* 
-c+S { �+[l-F(Na-a(R-y2))]rri (a,a)} if· y2*::R::y�*+X
-c+S { �+[1-F (Na-aX)] l� (a ,a) ) if R � yr + x 
-22-
1 - 1 where rr2 = �2(a) and rr1 (a,a) = �1 (a). Fr om (2.30) it is clear that
2 (2.3l)IT12(R/N,a) 
and 
2 
(2.32)IT22(R/N,a)
0 if R :: y2* 
-
- 1 aY2 -a!3f[Na-a(R-y2)Jrr1 (a,a)(l- ail"") if y2*::R::y�* + x
0 if R > y** + X- 2 
1 1 1 ) f3 ([l-F(Na)]JI11 (a,a)-Nf(•)II1 (a,a) + rr22 if R::y2*
( - 1 1 l} f3 [l-F(Na-a(R-y2))JII11 (a,a)-Nf(•)rr1�a,a) + rr22 
if y * < R � y** + X 2 - - 2 
( - 1 1 l l } !3 [1-F(Na-aX)]Illl (a,a)-Nf (·)IT1 (a,a) + rr22 
if R > y ** + X- 2 
so that rri2 � 0 and rr�2 < O. From (2.29') and (2.31) one can easily
arrive at the conclusion.that rr�2 > O.for t = 3, • • •  ,T while rr�2 < 0 
for t =  l, . . •  ,T. 
In the event that no dam exists equation (2.28) becomes* 
t t-1 I (2.33)Il (x/N,a) = �(x/N,a) + f3E{II (x N,a)} 
and (2.29') becomes 
* 
Recall that x in �(x/N,a) is observed at the beginning of period t and 
hence rrt(x/N,a) is deterministic. 
t ( 2.34) n2(x/N,a)
t so that n12(x/N,a)
for X > 0 we have 
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{ lt-1 
f"" 
t-1 
. . 
}-c+S jn2 (x/N,a)dF(x) + n1 (x/N,a)dF(x) 0 • 
0 and n�2(x/N,a) < 0 for all t. Since R > x 
(2.35) t t IT2(R/N,a) > IT2(x/N,a).
Equation (2. 35) leads directly to 
Proposition 2.2: Under equal sharing of water among N identical expected 
profit maximizing firms with separable profit functions, water users 
find it optimal to construct greater diversion capacity when a reservoir 
is operated optimally, in the sense of Proposition 2.1, than when no dam 
exists at all (i.e., when no water is ever stored in the reservoir). 
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I I I. APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS 
In this section we parallel the development of the previous 
section for the case of appropriative water rights. The one period 
profit function is g(y,a) = �(y,a);but for the most part, similarities 
end there. In particular, the rule for determining. optimal releases 
is not straightforward as a result of non-convexities in the aggregate 
profit function. 
A. Optimal Releases 
Under the appropriative doctrine prior appropriators have seniority 
in rights to those rights holders appropriating later in time. We 
label appropriators in order of decreasing priority; i.e., the first 
appropriator has rights in the amount a1 and his claims to water must
be completely satisfied before other appropriators receive water. 
Similarly, if a. is the ith appropriator's right to water, then
l 
i-1 th A. 1 = E a. represents the claims to water senior to those of the i 
l- j=� 
appropriator; the ith appropriator receives no water unless releases
exceed Ai-l' 
Consequently, with one period remaining, profits for the
.th . 
i appropriator are
(3 .1) gl(yl,ai,R) = g(yl-:i-l'ai) 
{ g(o,a ) 
g(ai,ai)
(Ao :: O) 
if y1 ::_ Ai-l
if Ai-l ::_ yl :: Ai
if yl ::_ Ai 
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and* 
if yl < Ai-l {o
a 1 (3.2 )  % , :1 (Yi-'il if Ai-l � y < Ai
if Y1 ::::_Ai
so that the smallest value of y1 which maximizes � g1(y1,ai,R�y�, satisfiesi=l 
y1* = ')i· Thus optimal one period release policy is 
(3 .3) ;1 = { �-
R-X 
if R � � 
if 1)i::R::1)i+X
ifR::::_'\J+X
1 1 - 1" Let G (R-Ai-l ' ai) = max _g (y1,ai,R) = g (y1 , aiR) . Then 0 <R - y < X - 1 -
(3.4) G1(R-A. 1,ai) = g(R-A. 1,a.) if Ai l  < R < A. 
{ g(o,ai) if R � Ai-l 
.1- i- 1 - - - 1 
with 
(3. 5) 
g (ai,ai) if R ::::_ Ai 
if R < Ai-l{o
1 
Gl (R-Ai-l'ai) = :1 (R-Ai-1 ) if Ai-l � R � Ai 
if R. ::::_ Ai
Thus aggregate optimal prof its with one period remaining are 
* . Since g(y,a) = n(y,a), n12 = 0 implies that g1 (y,a) = g1 (y). 
(3. 6) 
and 
(3. 7) 
N 1 )i; G (R-Ai-l'ai i=l 
N 1 
i; G1(R-A. 1,a.)i=l i- i 
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N 
g(R,a1) + � g(o,ai) if R � � 
: 1=2 
j-1 • N 
l: g(a.,ai) + g(R-A._1,aj) + l: g(o,ai)i=l 1 J i=j+l 
N 
i; g(a.,ai)
i=l i 
gl (R)
gl (�-Aj-1 ) 
0 
if Aj-l � R � Aj
if R ::::_ ')i 
if R < Al
if A. < R < AjJ -
if R ::_ '\J 
Note that ci1 � 0 where ci1 exists but that Gi and ci1 do not exist at
Al, .A z, . •  • ')i· 
With two planning periods remaining expected profits for the ith
firm are
(3.8) 2 g (y2,ai,R)
{A -a(R-y ) i-J. 2 
g(o,ai) + S !G1(o,ai)dF(x) + 
Ai - a ( R-y2)
f G1[a(R-y2)-Ai-l+x,ai]dF(x) + Ai-1 -a (R-y 2) 
�G1(a
i
,ai)dF(x)} if Yz � Ai-l 
Ai-a(R-y2)
g(y2-Ai-l'ai) + sl·l if Ai-1 � Yz �Ai
g(ai,ai) + S l·l if Yz ::. Ai 
so that 
(3. 9) 
and 
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A -\i(�-y2)
g(o,ai} +S { F[Ai_1-a(R2-y2)] G\o,ai) + f1[a(R-y2) 
Ai-lu(R-y2) 
- Ai_1+x,ai]
dF(x) 
+ [l-F(A.-a(R2-y2))]G
1
(a.,a.) } if Yz < A. 1 l. l. l. - 1.-
g(y2-Ai-l'ai) + S /·l 
g(ai,ai) + S/·I 
if Ai-1 2 Yz 2 Ai 
if Yz '.: Ai 
N 2 l: g (y2,a. ,R) 
i=l l. 
N {N l g(y2,a1) + l: g(o,ai) + S : F(Ai_1-a(R-y2))G (o,ai) i=2 i=l 
N Ai-a (R-y2) 
+ �
=l 
JG1(a(R2-y2) - Ai_1+x,ai)dF(x) 
Ai-l-a(R-y2) 
N 1 }+ E [l-F(Ai-a(R-y2))]G (ai,ai) i=l if Yz � A1 
j� N 
E g(ai,ai) + g(y2-A._1,aj) + l: g(o,a.) + S/·) i=l J i=j+l l. 
if Aj-l2Yz2Aj 
N-1 
: g(ai,ai) + g(yz-�-1·�) +S{•} if �-1�Y2�� i=l 
N 
E g(ai,a.) + S{·} i=l l. 
H Yz?:. � 
i 
L 
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A -a(R-y ) 
gl(y2) 
N i 2 
- af3�
=
l f Gi[a.(R-y2) - Ai_1+x,ai]dF(x) 
Ai-l-a(R-y2) if Yz < � 
A.-a(R-y ) 
N 2 
(3.10) l: � -
i=lay2 -
gl (y2-Aj-l) 
N 
i 2 
- a.S�
=l 
}i[a(R-y2)-Ai_1+x,ai]dF(x) 
Ai-l-a(R-y2) 
if Aj_1:y2<Aj 
A.-a(R-y ) 
N i 
2 
-aSE JGi[a(R-y2)-Ai-l+x'ai]dF(x) 
if Yz '.: � i=l 
Ai-l-a(R-y2) 
Define y2*(j) as the smallest value of y2, A.
 1 < y2 < A. satisfying J- - - J 
(3.11) O=g1 (y2*(j)-Aj-l) 
A. 
N l. 
- a.SE JGl (x-Ai-l 'ai)
dF (x), j = 1, • · • • N • 
i=l 1 
Ai-1 
y�(j) can be interpreted as the smallest value of R � Aj-l such that if N
R = y�(j) then .L g
2 
is �ximized by choosing y2 = y�(j)(=R). Clearly 
i=l 
y*2(j) > A. 1, assuming lim g(d,a) = + "'• Similarly define y**(j) as the J- d+O 2 
smallest value of y2, A. 1 < y2 < A. which satisfies . J- - - J 
(3.12) 0 = g (y**(j)-A. ) 1 2 J-1 
N 
fA.�a.x_ 
-as: G1(aX+x-Ai-l'ai)dF(x) i=l -
i-1-a.X 
for j=l, • • •  ,N. y�*(j) can be interpreted as the smallest value of 
- - N 2 R - X >_ Aj 1 such that if R - X = Y*z* (j) , then. L g is max
imized by choosing - - i=l 
Yz = y�*(j). 
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It should be noted that because of the kink in g(d,aj) at g(aj ,aj), 
it might be the case that no v al ues y�(j), y�* (j) e xis t satisfying 
(3.11) and (3.12). The case is as depicted below 
$/dj 
\ gl (y,-A,_,J 
� 
-�������-.�����-������� A 
B 
dj a. J 
N Ai 
where A = o:S
i
�l J ci(x - Ai-l'ai) dF(x), 
Ai-1 
B 
N 
J
Ai- ax l -a[\h G1 (ax+ x - Ai -l'ai )dF(x). Ai - 1-ax 
In the case shown in the figure, (3.10) and (3.1 1) are not satisfied. 
As a matter of conventio n, we define y�(j) = y�*(j) = Aj for thi s case.
Because lim g 1(d) = + 00, then, so long as A and B satisfy A> g1(a.), 
d+O J 
B > gl (aj), ( 3.1 0) and (3 . 1 1) will always be satidie d with y� (j) < Aj, 
y�*(j) < Aj. 
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We also note that in the case A> g1(aj), B > g1(aj), 
Aj-l < y�(j) < y�* (j) < Aj. To see this, consider 
d 
d(ax) 
N f A. -o:X 1 l -l: G1(ax+x-A._1,a.)dF(x)i=l - l l 
Ai- 1 -o:X
1 -G1(o,ai)f(-o:X) 
1 -G1 (aN,aN)f(� - o:X ) 
N 
+ l: 
i=l J
A. - X
l 1 -
_ G11 (o:X + x - Ai -l' ai )dF(x) 
Ai-1 -o:X 
< o for a x > o 
since f(x) = 0 for x < 0, lim c1
1(x,a.)f(x)
x+O 1 
0 by convergence of the 
1 1 integral G1(x,ai) � 0,  c1 Cx,ai) < O.
Hence, from (3.10) and (3.11) we have 
A. 1 < Y*z(j) < Y*2*(j) <A. J- - - J 
with strict inequalities if A> g1(aj), B > g1(aj). Generally y2(R,j) 
sa tisf ie s 
0 - . 
l 2 1 -
N 
J
A. -a(R-y) 
g1[Y2(R,J} - Aj_1J-- aSi:l _ 
c1[a(R-y2) - Ai -l +x,a1]dF(x),
Ai-l-a(R-y2) 
when such a y 2 exists cY 2 (R,j) = Aj 
o t herwis e) , with y� (j) 2 R 2 Y�* (j) + X.
Thus with two periods remaining the policy for optimal releases is 
R 
:Y2<R,l) 
R-X 
R 
12<R, 2) 
R-X 
(3.14) Yz R 
:Y2 (R,j) 
R-X 
R 
:Y2<R,N) 
R-X 
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if R :: Yz*(l) 
if Yz*(l) �. R � y�*(l) + X
if y�*(l) + X � R � X +Al 
if X + A1 � R � Yz*(Z) 
if Yz*(Z) � R � y�*(Z) + X
if y�*(2) + X � R � X + A2 
if X + Aj-l : R: Yz*(j)
if y *(j) < R < y**(j) + X 2 - - 2 
if y�*(j) + X � R � X + Aj 
if X + �-l : R: Yz*(N) 
if Yz*(N) � R � y�*(N) + X 
if R '.::, y�* (N) + X
From (3.14) the distortive effect of the appropriative doctrine is 
obvious; water is released to the first appropriator until at the margin 
the expected aggregate present value of future use of stored water 
exceeds the current marginal profitability of water use by the first 
appropriator. As the appropriative doctrine prohibits the second 
appropriator from receiving water until the first appropriator's claims 
are completely satisfied, water is stored until either the reservoir 
is full and spilled water satisfies the first appropriator or the 
present marginal expected profitability of futu�e water use falls below 
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the current marginal expected profitability of water use by the first 
appropriator.* Only then do deliveries to the second appropriator 
commence. A similar procedure is followed for the second appropriator, 
etc. 
Intuitively what is happening is that in the early years after a dam 
is built, water beyond the needs of the senior appropriator tends to be 
stored. As capacity of the dam is reached, the river begins to look 
much like a certain stream flow for senior appropriators and like an 
undammed river with average flows of less than the expected value of 
stream flows to junior appropriators. 
F . . . 1 d f. f h . th or convenience we write optima expecte pro its or t e i 
appropriator as 
(3 .15) G
2
(R-Ai-l ' ai) 
* 
{ 
� . 1 g(o,a.)+S F[A. 1-a(R-y2)JG (o,a.) i i- i 
Ai-a(R-y2) 
f 1 A 
+ G [a(R-:2) + x - Ai-l'ai]dF(x) 
Ai-l-a
(R-y2) 
A 1 ) -+ [1-F(Ai�a(R-yz))]G (ai,ai ) if R � x + Ai-1. 
g(R-A. 1,a.) +S{•} i- i if x+Ai_1�R�y2*(i) 
g[y2(R,i)-Ai-l'ai]+S{•} if Yz*Ci):R:�.Y�*(i)+X 
g(R-X-A. 1,a.)+S{·} if Y*z*(i)+X<R<X+A. i- i - - i 
g(a.,a.)+S{•} i i if R>X+A. - i 
If y�*(l) = A1, then the solution is greatly simplified. Observe that if 
y�*(j) = Aj' then g11 < 0 and aj > ai for j < i imply y�*(i) = Ai for 
i > j. - We later establish aj > ai for j < i. In the case y�*(l) = A1, 
deliveries to the second appropriator occur when R = X + A
1
, to the 
third when R = X + A2, etc. 
...J2..., 
since wr it ing out the explicit form for (3 . 15 )  would require the sub­
st itut ion of y2 from (3 . 14 ) into the d iscount ed t erm on the r ight hand 
side of (3 . 15 ) . In doing this one would obta in 3 (i-l )  t erms replac ing 
the f irst l ine of (3 . 1 5 )  and 3 (N-i )  t erms r eplacing the last l ine ; 
i . e . , wr it t en out completely (3 . 1 5 )  involve s  3N e�pr e s s ion s , one
hold ing on each o f  3N int erval s .
I n  a manner s imilar t o  that above w e  can show that there exi s t  
y� (j ) , y�* (j ) ,  yt (R , j ) , ( subj ect t o  t h e  s ame qualifications holding at 
A1 , • • .  � as noted ab ove ) j = 1 ,  • • •  , N ,  s uch that the op t imal release 
p olicy wi th t periods remaining is 
R 
y
t (R , l )
R-X 
R 
(3 . 1 6)  yt = 
j y
t (R , j
) 
R-X 
R 
yt (R , N ) 
R-X 
if R < y * (l ) - t 
if y * (l ) < R < y** (l ) + X t - - t . 
if y�* (l ) + X ::  R ::  X + Al 
if X + Aj -l :: R ::  yt* (j )
if y * (j ) < R <  y** (j ) + X  t - - t 
if yt** (j ) + X < R< X + Aj 
if X + �-l :: R :: yN* (j )
if y * (N ) < R < y** (N ) + X t - - t 
if R > y** (N ) + X - t 
and , in mo st compact form , exp ect ed pro f it s for the ith appropr iator
are 
(3 . 1 7 )  Gt (R-Ai-1 ' ai) 
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t -1 A 
g (o , a 1 )+SE{ G [ a (R-yt )+x-Ai-l ' a i] }
if R ::_ X + Ai-l 
t -1 -g (R-Ai-l ' ai )+SE{ G  ( • ) } if X+Ai-l::R::yt* ( i ) 
g [ yt (R , i ) , a i] +SE{ G
t -l
( • ) } if yt * ( i ) ::_R�y�* (i )+X 
g (R-X-A . 1 , a . )+SE{ G
t -l ( • ) }  if " y** ( i ) +X<R<X+Ai 1.- l. t - -
t -1 -g (a . , a . ) + SE{ G ( · ) S } if R > X + A . 
l. l. - l. 
Propo s it ion 3 . 1 : . Under the appropria t ive doctrine of wat er r ight s ,
a reservo ir manager who maximiz e s  the aggregat e  exp ect ed prof itabil ity 
of downstream r ight s owner s follows the patt ern o f  o p t imal relea ses 
given by (3 . 1 6 ) . 
Remark : ·  As t he aggr egat e pro f it funct ion is not concave under t he 
appropr iat ive doctrine , t he ordering of relea s e s , a s  in Propo s it ion 2 . 1 , 
cannot be shown . 
B .  Op t imal D iver s ion Capac ity 
G iven that releases  are a s  in (3 . 1 6 ) consider the choi ces of diversion 
capacities by firms fa cing this s e t  of release rules . Different iating ( 3 . 1 7 )  
with respec t to  ai yields 
t 
-( 3 . 18) �G (R-Ai-l ' ai ) -ai 
d t-1 g2 + f3 d E {G [ a (R-y ) + x - Ai 1 , a . ] }  if R < X + A . 1 ai t - i _ i-
g2 + i3 d! . E {G
t
-\ - ) } if X + Ai- l _: R _: y� ( i )
l. 
d t-1 -g2 + f3 d E {G ( - ) }  i f  y* (.i) < R < y** ( i )  + X  ai t - - t 
g2 + 8 -d
d 
E {G
t-l ( · ) } i f y** ( i) + X < R < X + Ai a .  t - -
l. 
g2 + f3 d! . E { G
t- l ( · ) } if R � X + Ai 
l. 
and , let t ing y� 
.,.34.,., 
9yt / 8R while recall ing t hat g21 
0
A t -1 A -
(l -y� ) a SE { G 21 [ a (R-y2 )+x-Ai-l ' ai] } if R�X+Ai-l 
, t -1 -
(l -y ' ) a SE { G2 1 ( • ) } if X+A . 1 
< R < y * (i )  
t J_-.L - - t 
(3 . 1 9) t G21 (R-Ai-l ' a i) (l -; ' ) a SE{ G
t
2 1
-1 ( · ) }  if y * ( i )  < R < y** ( i )+X 
t t - - t 
I (l-;� ) a SE { G��
1
( - ) }  if y�* (i )+X '.: R '.: X+Ai 
& 
\ (l-;� ) a SE{ G��1 ( · ) }  if R � X+Ai 
In (3 . 1 9) yt take s  on d if f er ent value s  dependent on the value
 
of R as def ined by (3 . 1 6 ) . In part icular y� = l on the f ir st and third
int erval s  o f  each triplet in (3 . 1 6 ) , whil e on the s econd int erval o f
e a c h  t r iplet yt (R , j
) is def ined by t he neces sary cond i t ion 
N 
(3 . 2 0) 0 - . t -1 - . g1 [ yt (R , 3 ) -A3. _1 J - a S � E{ Gl ( a (R-yt (R , J ) )+x-Ai-l ' a i] } i=l 
for j 1 ,  • . .  , N .  Differ ent iat ing (3 .  2 0) wit h  respect to R and solving 
for 3 yt (R , j ) / 3R=y� (R , j )  
yield s ,  for j = l ,  . . . , N , 
(3 . 21 )  y� (R , j ) 
N t -1 -
a SE E{ G11 [ a (R-y )+x-A .  1 , a . J } i=l t J - J 
- N t -1 -g11 (y -R)+a SZ E{ Gll [ a (R-yt )+x-A . _1 , a . ] }- t i=l J J 
By an induction argument E {G��1 ( . ) }  < 0 for all t s 1 ·  that y� (j ) < y�·� (j )
implie s  0 < y � (R , j )  < l for t =  l ,  . . .  , T  and j = l , . . . , N . Wi th O < y� < l , 
ano ther induction argument yields G�1 (R-Ai-l ' ai ) > C in ( 3 . 19 ) .
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Precis ely what the implicat ions of thes e conditions are for . 
dis tribution of diversion capacities is p rob lema t i c .  If  w e  consider 
tr � c ontras t b etween a s ituation in which there is no dam (X = 0 )  and
one in which there is a dam op erat ing to maximiz e  exp ected profits  
according to the  appropriat ive rights s cheme , the following intui t ive
c omments might b e  mad e .  
Firs t ,  the capacity built b y  firm numb er 1 ,  the mo s t  s enior 
appropriat or , i s  certainly larger wi th a dam than if no dam exi s t s .
This f o llows b ecause the current and future expec ted profits  o f  f irm 
numb er 1 are assigned f irs t priori ty in the rules for operat ing the 
dam.  In particular , the IP.aj ar cos ts o f  the dam to wat er users , that 
i s ,  evaporation l o s s es and interest costs  as the dam i s  b eing filled , 
are borne by j unior appropriators . 
For firms j unior to f irm numb er 1 ( o r  p erhaps for f irms j unior t o  
a few mo st  s enior firms ) , t h e  s tructure o f  the rules for operating the
dam sugges t  s trongly that divers ion capacities built wi th a dam are 
less than wi th no dam .  Intuitively, this is because with a dam , 
j unior appropriators mus t  b ear the evaporat ion losses from maintaining . 
th e dam clo s e  to capac ity , and mus t for ego the use  of water during the 
early years of dam op erations when the dam is f illing . We have not a t t emp ted 
to derive precis e  analyt i cal deriva tions o f  these intuit ive results , however . 
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IV, ECONOMIC EFFIC IENCY 
Economic ineff ic ienc ies arise und er t he appro priat ive d o c t r ine a s
a cons equen c e  o f  t h e  unequal shar ing of r i sk imp l ic it i n  t h e  hierarchy 
o f  p r io r it ie s  among o t herwi s e  id ent ical wa t er � s er s . In part icular we 
f ind t hat the appropr iat ive s y s t em l ead s to product ion ine f f i c i enc ie s  
a s  aggr ega te expected  p r o f i t s  a r e  inc reased by the imp o s i t ion o f  a n  equal 
shar ing a l l o c at ion thr ough the r e d i s t r ib u t ion o f  water rights . We then show 
t ha t  the int ro du c t ion of comp et it iv e  mar ke t s  in which wa t er r ight s 
may be f r eely bought and sold in f a c t  e f f ec t s  such an equal shar in g 
allocat ion , an appl icat ion o f  the C o a s e  theor em [4] .  We f ir s t  however
p r e s ent t he f o l l owing propo s it ion , ind icat ing the allocat ive ine f f iency 
o f  the appro p r ia t ive d o c t r in e . 
Propo s it ion 4 .1 :  Und er the approp r ia t ive d o c t r in e  s enior approp r iat o r s
build mor e  d iv er s ion capac ity than do j un io r  appropr ia t o r s ;  i . e . , 
a1 > a 2 > • . •  > aN > 0.
Pro o f : The proof is g iven for an arbitrary plan for r el ea s e s  wher e 
y
t is the schedule f o r  r e l ea s e s  when t p e r io d s  r ema in unt il t he end o f 
the hc;i r izon . We c on s id er the b ehav ior o f  the i
th and i+l st appro p r ia t o r s ,  
from which the general r e sult f o l l ows . The it h appro p r ia t o r  p icks a .  
l. 
so a s  to s a t i s f y  
( 4 . 1) dG
t
( R-A , a . )  Ta-:- i-1 l. 
l. 
0 (- ) Q d . { t - 1 [ - } g2 y -Ai 1 , a . + " d E G a (R-y ) + x-A . 1 , ai ] t - l. a i t i-
-3 7 -
whil e the i+l st appro p r iator p icks a i+l s o  a s  t o sat i s f y
( 4 . 2 )  dG
t - d · t-1 -
dai 
( R-Ai , al+l) = 0 = g 2 (yt-Ai , ai+l) + 13 da� E {G [ a (R-y t ) + x-Ai , ai+l ] 
Suppo s e  a i = a i+l ' 
t -1 S in c e  G1 2 ( • , a i )  : 0 from (3 . 1 8 )  and g 12= 0 , 
wi th Ai > Ai - l ( 4 . 1 ) and ( 4 .
2) yield 
( 4 .  3) dGt dGt (R-A . l a . ) > d(R-A . , a . ) ai i- ' i ai i i 
which is impo s s ibl e .  Since G�2 < 0 we conclud e  that a i > a i+l '
Pro po s it ion 4 . 1  ind icat e s  a p o t ent ial man if e stat ion o f  inef f ic ienc y ,  
caused b y  the unequal allocat ion o f  r isk , but d o e s  no t ac tually d emon -
s t ra t e  the presence o f  inef f i c i enc ie s .  To d o  t h i s  we show t ha t  f o r  
any arb itrary r e l e a s e  pol icy , yt , t =l ,  . • .  , T ,  aggregat e appro p r iat ive
pro f i t s  are always incr e a s ed by reallo c a t ing r e l ea s e s  on the b as i s of 
e qual shar ing , and , t hat t h e  o p t imal e qual shar ing allo c a t ion yie lds a 
glo bal maximum . 
Suppo s e  t hat wat er r ight s are r ea s s igned so t ha t f irm j r e c e iv e s  
y:j p er c ent o f  a n y  r e l e a s e  i n  the int erval [A . 1 , A . ]  wit h t p er io d sl. l. - 1 
r ema in ing and s: . p e r c ent o f  the it h f irms d ivers ion capacity a i with 1J 
. . t t N t - N t p e r io d s  r ema in ing , wh ere y . . > 0, S i . > 0, and l. Y . .  =l= l. S  ' j ' 1J - J - j =l 1J j =l 1  
i , j =l ,  • • •  , N  and t = l, • • •  , T . For convenience l e t  y t
t t t 
[y ij J ,  13 = [ 13ij ] and 
. A t N t A t  i e f ine a .  by E 13 . . a .  = a . .J i=l l.J 1 J With one p e r i o d  remaining , aggregate p ro f i t s  
Erom s uch a r eallocat ion , i n  view o f  ( 3 . 1 ) are 
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As allocat ive ineff ic iency in the appropriat ive system ar ises from 
the unequal d istribut ion of r isk among r ight s holders ,  the Coase theorem 
sugg est s t hat the introduct ion of competit ive market s in wat er right s 
and d iversion capac ity should provid e a solut ion to the problem .  We 
let yt and S
t be as above and define p: and q: as prices of a onel. l. 
percent share of f irm i ' s  water r ight and d iversion capac ity ,  respec t ively , 
in per iod t .  With t he init ial vector of investment , (a1 , a2
, . . . aN ) ' 
g iven any f ixed aggregate  investment , � ·  wit h one. per iod remaining , f irm
. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
J chooses  the vectors y . = (y1 . , • • • , yN . ) and S .  = ( S1 . , . • •  , SNj ) J . J J J J 
so a s  to maximiz e 
(4 . 1 0 )  1 1 1 h (yj , Sj ) 
i-11 1 - A l  g [ E yk . ak+y i . (yl -Ai-1 ) , aj ] + k=l J J 
1 N 1 1 1 N 1 1 
+ p . -E Yi · P · + q . -E s . .  q i if A . 1 < y1 < A . J i=l J l. J i=l l.J l.- - - l. 
where yt , t=l , • • •  , T , is a fixed but arbitrary release  policy . Necessary 
conditions require 
Al gl [ • , aj ] ak , k=l , • • •  , i-1
(4 . 11 ) pt (yl ) 
A l  gl [ • , aj ] (yl -Ai-1 ) k = i 
0 k = i+l , • • •  , N 
if Ai-l ::. y1 ::. Ai , and 
(4 . 12 )  1 Al qk = g2 [ • , aj ] ak , k  = 1 ,  • • • , N 
N 1 N 1 In equilibrium E S . = (1 , 1 , • • •  , 1 ) = E y .  and (4 . 11 ) and (4 . 12 )  hold for 
j =lJ j =l J 
j =l , • • •  , N .  In view of the concavity of g this yield s y
l 
= ( l /N ] = Sl 
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so that (4 . 11 ) and (4 . 12 ) become{ gl (y1/N , a ) ak , k=l , • • •  , i-l
(4 '. 13 ) P �  C1, l = 'i CY/: , � Hr1-A1_1 l , k= i 
O ,  k - i+l ,  • • • , N
i f  Ai-l ::. y1 ::_ Ai and 
(4 . 14 ) qt = g2 (y�/N , a ) ak , k = l , • • •  , N . 
Thus in fact the competit ive market induces an equal sharing allocat ion . 
By analogy with the analysis  leading to Propo sit ion 4 . 2  we see t hat 
(4 .15 )  p� (yt )
{ gl (�t /N , a )a� 
-
k=l , • • •  � i-1 
gl (yt /N , a ) (yt Ai-1 ) ,  k-i 
O ,  k = i+l ,  • . •  , N 
if Ai-l ::. yt ::. Ai , and
(4 . 1 6 )  q� = g2 (yt /N , a ) ak , k=l , • • •  , N .  
Equat ions (4 . 1 5 )  and (4 . 1 6 )  def ine the tth period prices  o f  wa ter
and diver s ion capacity for a g iven level o f  announced releases . For a 
given level of releases , these prices do not vary intert emporally .  
The price of one percent of a senior  f irm ' s capac ity exceeds that for 
one percent of a j unior firm ' s  capacity a s  senior f irms own more capa-
city (Propo sit ion 4 . 1 ) ; however the pr ice  per unit of  capacity is  equal­
iz ed among firms ; i . e . , while r < s implies qt > qt , we s t ill haver s 
qt/a = qt/a • r r s s Observe also that  the separability of � = g implies t hat
qt are constant intertemporally regardless of release level s .r 
On the other hand (4 . 15 )  and Propo s it ion 4 . 1  imply that pt >ptr - s 
for r < s wit h  s t r i c t  in e qual i t y  for r < i .  Since yt is  observed
-42.-
(announced ) before pric es are d e t ermined , r i sk do e s  not ent er and 
t t t I t -p i 1 / a = p /a for r < s < i , and p .  1 a i 1 = p . / (y -A . 1 ) so that- r s s i- - i t i-
the price per unit o f  wat er is cons tant among suppl ier s .  
Unf o r t una t ely there ar e some probl em s  with t he s e  c o n c l u s ion s .
F ir s t , many f irms are l e a s ing d iver s ion capac it y that they know with 
c er t a inty they will no t b e  able to u s e ,  suggesting a l ikely breakdown 
o f  the equil ibr ium a t t a ined . Second l y ,  (p er ha p s  c o s t l y )  transac t ions 
are required every t ime per iod , l ead ing to  unc er t a inty concerning the
t enure o f  the new r ight s o b t a ined and the l ikely unravel ing o f  t h e  
e qu il ibr ium allocat ion . Consequent l y  a mo r e  in t er e s t ing qu e s t ion 
conc erns t h e  ex i s t enc e o f  cont ingency prices which a l low r ight s owner s 
to insur e aga in s t low wat er ava ilab i l i t y  by a onc e and for a l l  trans-
a c t ion . In thi s c a s e  a =  [ Yi . ]  and 8 = [ S . .  ] ar e a pr ior i c o n s t antJ 1.J -
be tween t ime per iod s ; on ce cho s en they are contrac tua l l y  f ixed . If the
contract i s  ef f e c t ed wit h only one p e r io d  r ema in .�ng , (4 . 13 )  and (4 . 1 4 ) 
d ef ine the cont ing enc y p r i c e s  of wa t er and d iver s ion cap ac i ty . To s e e  
t h i s  l e t  
i -1 
(4 . 1 7 )  
1 
h ( yj , Sj ) g [ L Yk . ak + y ij (yl -A ' _l ) , a . Jk= l J 1. J 
r e p r e s ent gro s s  p r o f it s to f irm j when Ai-l � y1 � Ai . F irm j c·ho o s e s  
yj and S . so a s  t o  max imiz e n e t  prof it s ,  g iven bvJ -
-1 - ) (4 . 18 )  h (y , , S . ; yl J J 
1 A l  N A l A l N A l h ( Y . , S . )  + p , - E Y . . p . + q ,  - L S i . q i J J J i-1 1.J 1. J i-1 J 
where ;: and �: are t he one period cont ingency p r i c e s  o f  f irm j ' s
J J 
wat er and d iver s ion capacity when A1_1 � y1 � A1 . In v i ew of (4 . 1 0 )  
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and (4 . 11 ) , we have 
(4 . 1 9 )  A l  (- ) 1 (- ) pk Y1 = Pk Y1 
with the equal shar ing allo cat ion obtaining . 
With two p er io d s  r emain ing gro ss pro f it s f o r  firm j are
(4 . 2 0)  h2 (yj , Sj ; y2 ) 
i-1 A l  1 
g [ E  yk , ak + yi . (y2 -A . 1 ) , a . J  + SE{ h (y . , f3 . ; y1 ) }k= l J J 1.- J J J . 
when Ai-l � y2 � Ai . Firm j c ho o s e s  y .  and S .  so as to maximize netJ J 
pro f it s ,  g iv en by 
(4 . 2 1 ) -2 - 2 - 2 
N A 2 A 2  M A 2h (y . , 8 . ; y2 )  = h (y , , 8 . ; y2 ) + P .  - E y . j p i + q . - E S , . q . J J J J J i=l 1 J i= l 1J 1. 
In view of t he concavity of g ,  n ec e s sary c ondit ion s f o r  pro f it 
max imizat ion ho l d ing for j = l , • • •  , N imply t ha t
(4 . 2 2 )  
and 
(4 . 23 ) 
A 2 pk (y2 ) p� (y2 ) + SE{ pt (yl ) } 
A 2  2 1 
qk = qk + S qk = qk (l+ S )  
t h e  l a s t  e qual i t y  in (4 . 23 )  ho ld ing s ince t he q� are int ertemporally
c o n s t an t . By · induc t ion we have generally
(4 .  24 )  A t  pk (yt ) 
t 
L St E{ t - s c - ) }Pk Yt-s s=o 
whe r e  pk (y0 ) = O, and 
(4 . 2 5 )  A tqk 
t-1 
qk l: s
s
. 
s=o 
We summar ize the s e  resul t s  a s  
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Propo sit ion 4 .  3 :  Suppo se  that the release pol icy f,,r a reservo ir 
is  y t ,  t=l , . . .  , T .  If , und er t he appropriat ive doctr ine o f  wat er r ight s ,  
comp e t it ive market s in wat er r ight s and d iver s ion capac ity ar e introduced 
wit h transact ion s consummat ed in each t ime p er iod a f t er the actual 
release in t hat period is kno��1 ,  then with t period s rema in ing the 
equil ibr ium pric e s  of  wat er and d iver s ion capacity for f irm k are 
g iven by 
(4 . 1 5 ' ) p� (yt ) 
{ rr1 (�t/N ,a )ak ,  k=l , • . .  ��-1 
rr 1 (y /N , a ) (y t -Ai-l ) , k- 1  
0 k = i+l , • . .  , N 
if Ai-l � yt � Ai , and 
(4 . 1 6 ' ) qk (yt ) = rr2 (yt /N , a ) ak , k=l , . . •  , N  
with qk (yt ) = qk if rr12 = 0 .  These pr ic e s  induc e  a n  equal shar ing 
allo cat ion . of wat er and d iver s ion capac it y ;  moreover , t he pr ic e per unit 
of  wat er is equal among suppl iers and the price p er unit of  d iver s ion 
capac ity is  equal iz ed among all f irms . The pr ic e p er unit o f  wat er right 
is J10n-decrea s ing wi.th incr easing seniority ,  
Corollary : If r econtrac t ing is not p ermit t ed in each t ime period and if 
the market is establ ished with t p er io d s  rema ining , the cont ingency prices 
for f irm k ' s wat er (;k
t ) and d iver sion capacity (;k
t) when A. 1 $ y $ A, ,
J_- t l 
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ar e given by (4 . 24 ) and (4 . 2 5 ) r e spect ively . 
At At Mor eover , pk > pm and
At At At t 
pk/ak > pm/am for k < m whil e qk/ak = �/am for all 
k , m .  
-4 6-
V .  DECENTRALIZED DECISION MAKING UNDER EQUAL SHARING 
Propositions 2 . 1  and 2 . 2 sugge s t  the po s s ibil ity of achieving a 
s imultaneously opt imal combinat ion o f  d iver s ion capacity and release 
policies g iven ind ependent and uncoord inat ed opt imizat ion dec i s ions 
by f irm owner s and the reservo ir manager . The failure of such a 
propo s i t ion to hold could result in informat ional probl ems or provide 
inc ent ives for f irms to misrepr e s ent their int ended act ions and 
ul t imat ely preclude the at tainment of the "opt :!nmm o p t imorem" . 
However , we show t hat such a decentral iz a t ion mechanism do e s  ex ist 
and the sequent ial r eac t ions of  f irms to r el ea s e  policies (and of 
the r e s ervo ir manag er to d iver s ion capac ity decision s )  ul t imately 
resul t s  i n  conver g enc e t o  a s imu l t an eo u s l y  opt imal s t eady-state combin-
ation of release policies and diversion capacities , ignoring gaming 
c omp l icat ions . The analysis is presented in the context of an infinit e  
lived dam as this allows u s  t o  avoid increasingly cumb ersome induction 
proofs and p rovides a more natural framework in whi ch to pursue o ther 
ques t ions in the next section .  
S in c e  a t  any j uncture there are an inf inite number o f  p er io d s  
rema ining , t imescript s a r e  r edundant and hence a r e  omit t ed . We let  
(5 . 1 ) 'TT (y , a , R) 'TT (y/N , a )  + SE{ IT [ a. (R:y)+x , a ) }
repr e s ent expec t ed pro f it s  when y is relea s ed in the current p er iod , 
g iven t hat wat er ava ilable is R , and d e c i s ions are mad e o p t imally in 
perio d s  therea f t er . 
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Lett ing 
( 5 . 2 )  II (R/N , a )  a. (R-y)+x max { 'TT (y/N , a )+ SE{ II [  . " , a ] } } 
o::R-y::x 
we det ermine the optimal relea s e  pol icy to be y where 
; . F(:) 
if R :: y* 
(5 . 3 )  if y� :: R :: y* *+X 
R-X if R > y**+X 
and , d if ferentiat ing (5 . 1 )  with r e sp ec t  to y and equat ing t he r e sult 
t o  z ero , y (R) is  g iven by 
(5 . 4 ) 'TTl c
Y/N ) a. SE{ II [ a (R-y) + x 1 - , a ) } 0
y* is g iven by the smallest  value of y that satisfies  
(5 . 5 )  'TTl (y*/N)  -a. 8E{ IT1 (x/N , a ) } = 0 
and y ** is given by the smallest value of y that satisfies 
(5 . 6) 
Thu s 
(5 . 7 ) 
* 
'TT
l 
(y** /N ) - a. SE{ Ill (a;+x ,a ) } o .* 
'TT (R/N ,a) + SE{ IT (x/N , a ) } if R :: y*
{ - a. (R-y)+x -IT (R/N , a )  = 'TT (y/N , a )  + SE{ IT [ N , a ] }  if y* < R < y**+X 
R-X a.X+x -"TT ( -N, a )  +rm{ rr (-N-, a ) } if R > y**+X 
If  ( 5 . 5) does not hold , then y* a, and s imilarly for ( 5 . 6 ) . 
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r epresent s t h e  profit s accruing to  a typ ical f irm . *  Thus w e  have : 
Propo s it ion 5 . 1 :  Und er the equal shar ing doctrine , if the manager o f  
a reservo ir with a n  inf init e l ived dam releases  wat er s o  a s  t o  maximiz e 
the exp ec t ed pro f i t s  of N ident ical wat er u s er s ,  the o p t imal release 
pol icy exist s and is  unique and is  g iven by (5 . 3 ) wit h the exp e c t ed 
pro f i t s  for a typical f irm g iven by ( 5 . 7 ) .  
Propo sit ion 5 . 1  i s  the inf inite hor izon analogue t o  Propo s it ion 2 . 1 .  
We can establish the analogue to Propo s it ion 2 . 2  in a s imilar manner . 
Different ia t ing (5. 7 )  with respect to a ,  we have 
( 5 . 8 ) IT z (R/N , a ) 
- c + B -dd E {IT (x/N , a) } if R < y*a -
- c  + B d
d
a 
E {IT ( a (R-:_f) + x , a ]} if y* < R < y** + X
- c  + B d: E {IT (aX�x , a) }  i f  R > y** + X
where IT2 (R/N , a )  
0 det ermines opt imal d iver s ion capac ity .  B y  the
* 
Suf f ic ient cond it ions for the existenc e and uniqueness of IT ( • )  are 
g iven in Denardo [ 5] .  However the Blackwell [ 2 ]  suff ic ient cond it ion s 
are mor e  tractabl e :  let the transformat ion . T ,  be defined by 
{ a (R-y)+x } }  . 
TIT (R) = max _{ rr (y/N , a )+i3E JI [  " , a ] ; if 
O:SR-y:SX 
( i )  T is mono tone ; i . e . , u (z ) �v ( z )  implies Tu ( z ) �Tv (z ) for all z ;  and 
( i i )  T (IT+a ) �TIT+i3a ,  where a is a constant , 0�13< 1 , and IT+a = IT (R)+a ,
then JI i s  a un ique f ixed po int ; i . e . , t he solut ion t o  the dynamic pro ­
grannning problem ex i s t s  and is un ique . The r ead er can ea s ily ver if y 
that these condit ion s  are in fact sat isf ied , under the condit ion of the 
footno t e  o f  the previous pag e .  
Wit h  somewhat mor e  d il igence one can show t hat IT t+JI un iforml y ,  which,
with r elat ed d emonstrat ions , allows u s  t o  inf er that the pro per t ies  o f  
t h e  IT t ' s  from t h e  f inite hor izon problem obtain I o r  JI a s  well (see  
Bellman [ 1 ] ) . 
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uniform convergence of the sequence { ITt } to  IT (see footno t e  on p . 4 8 ) ,
IT12 (R/N , a )  � 0 whil e IT1 2 (x/N , a ) = 0 so that IT2 (R/N , a )  � IT2 (x/N , a ) . 
As IT 22  < 0, we have 
Propo s it ion 5 . 2 :  Und er equal shar ing o f  wat er among N id ent ical 
.expected prof it maximiz ing f irms , wat er user s  f ind it o p t imal to  con-
struct great er d iver s ion capac ity when an inf ini t e  l ived reservo ir i s  
o p erated o p t imally,  in t h e  s ense o f  Propo sit ion 5 . 1 ,  than when n o
dam exist s .  
Propo s it ions 5 . 1  and 5 . 2  raise the que s t ion o f  whether the indepen-
d ent an.d uncoord inated opt imiz ing behavior of f irm owners and the 
reservo ir manager would l ead to a j o intly o p t imal relea s e  po l ic y  and 
aggrega t e  d iver s ion capa c it y  investment (for a f ixed number of f irms ) . 
We will show that if such an o p t imum exist s ,  then it is attainable und er 
decentral iz ed behavior . 
Recall ing equat ion (5 . 1 )  and let t ing a rr (y , a , R) / a y 
opt imally
(5 . 9) rr y O = rr1 -a l3E{ IT1 } ,
- ..12'..._ JI where rr1 - o y/N ' 1 
a rr  az• with z a (R-y) + x N 
rry , we have*
Con s ider ing y � s  a func t ion of  a , d if f er ent iat ing (5 . 9 ) wit h respect 
to a and solving for dy/da yield s 
* In o rd er to s implify some forthcoming expr e s s ion s , we drop t he arguments
o f  rr , IT . and their derivat ive forms . 
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(5 . 1 0)  �, da ir =O y 
Na SE{ II
1 2
} 
2 < 0
ir l1 +a SE{ rr11 } 
Similarly , letting air (y , a ,R) / 3a= ira , we have optimally 
(5 . 11 ) 1T a 0 = ir2 + S :a{EII } 
Again considering y as a funct ion o f  a , d ifferent iat ing (5 . 11 )  with 
respect to a and solving for dy/da yields 
(5 . 1 2 ) �, da ir =O a 
N [ ir22+SE{ JI22 } ] 
a SE{ rr12 } < 
0 
If a simultaneously opt imum combinat ion (y , a , ) exist s ,  then at a 
regular maximum s e c ond order conditions require that 
E{ TI11 } E{ TI12 } 
(5 . 13 )  I I >  o 
E{JI21 } E{TI22 } 
for (y , a ) close to {y , a ) . In view of (5 . 13 )  one qu ickl y  obtains 
(5 . 14 ) I �, Ida ir =O < y �, da ir =O a 
which is suff icient for the desired convergence .  Thus we have : 
Propo sit ion 5 . 3 :  Under equal sharing of water released from an infinite 
lived dam , suppo se there exist s an optimal* combinat ion (y , a )
7i 
In view of (5 . 10 ) and (5 . 1 2 ); (y , a ) i s unique and the propo sit ion 
holds globally . 
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such that y maximizes expected profits given a ,  and a maximizes 
expected profits given y .  Then assuming a regular maximum, (y , a)
is a t t a inab l e  through the independent and uncoordina t e d  op t imi z ing 
behavior of the reservoir manager and the N firms . ( See Figure 5 . 1)
y 
y 
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a 
,...:b:, r da '![ = 0 
y 
a 
F igure 5 . 1 :  Decentralizat ion Mechanism Under Equal Shar ing
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VI . OTHER RESULT S 
In this sect ion we adduce some resul t s  concerning the relat ion-
ships between investment in reservo ir capacity and investment in 
d iver s ion capac ity under the doctrine of  equal shar ing . *  We ma intain 
the a ssumpt ion conc ern ing t he f ixity o f  N in order to" f ix idea s . 
Where aggregate investment in d iver s ion capac ity is r elevant we allow 
it to  cha nge only through the alt erat ion o f  capac it ie s by ind ividual 
f irms and not through industry ex it or  entry.  Al t ernat ively we could 
f ix aggregat e investment in d iver s ion capac it y and search for the 
opt imum number o f  f irms . The ramif icat ion s of unrestric t ed entry and
exit with regard to o p t imal f irm s i z e  and number in a stat ic s et t ing 
ace explored in [ 3 ] .  We have found no r ea son to  extrapolate  tho se 
r e sul t s  to  a dynamic environment and are content to  o b s erve t hat the 
po s s ibility of  incentive incompat ibil ity ar ises  und er the doctrine of 
equal shar ing, but this may ,  however , be pr ecluded by the presence of a 
range of decrea s ing average c o st s  in t he construct ion o f  d iver s ion 
capac ity .  
Our first  result concerns the opt imal ,s iz e of  the r e s ervo ir . We 
prop o s e  the f ict ion t hat downstream u ser s o f  \ :ater pay t he co st s o f  
dam building and maint enanc e ,  although t h i s  a s sumpt ion c an be mod if ied 
wit h  no substant ive alterat ion of r e sult s .  For symmetry we a s sume 
*As , under t he appropr iat ive doctrine , t he aggr egat e profit funct ion
may be non-concave , some of these resul t s  do not translat e for appro ­
priative wat er r ight s .  Mor eover , the inef f ic ienc ies inherent in the 
appropriat ive system render s the analogous r e sul t s  un inter est ing , 
regardl es s .
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t hat B = l / (l+r ) where r is the market rate o f  int erest . If c (X) i s  
t h e  c o s t  o f  construct ing (plus perhap s t h e  present value of o p erat ing 
and ma inta in ing )  a dam of size X and owner s make f ixed payment at the 
end o f  each t ime perio d , it  follows that thi s  annual p ayment for the 
r ep r e s e n t a t ive firm is 
(6 . 1 ) rC (X )  _ (1 - S ) C (X ) -N
- -
SN 
Let t ing TI (y , a , R) be net prof it s accruing to the t yp ical f irm when 
dam s i z e  is X , relea s e s  are y ,  d iver s ion capac ity is a , wat er ava ilabl e 
is R and d e c i s ions are to be mad e opt imally in all r emain ing t ime perio d s , 
we have 
( 6 . 2 )  TI (y , a , R )  
where IT (R/N , a )  
( 6 . 3 ) IT (R/N , a )  
7r (y/N , a )  - SrC (X) /N + BE{ IT [ ct (R;y)+x , a ) } 
max -
O�R-y�X 71 (y , a , R)  so t hat 
7r (R/N , a ) - SrC (X ) /N+ SE{ IT (x , N , a ) } if R � y* 
7r (y/N , a ) - SrC (X) /N+SE{ Il [ ct (R;Y+=E., a ] }  if y*�R �y**+X 
R-X - - ctX+x -7r (N, a ) - SrC (X ) /N+SE{ Il (-N-, a ) }  if R � y** + X 
where y* , y** and y (R) are a s  d e f ined by (5 . 5 ) , (5 . 6 )  and (5 . 4 ) . Let t ing 
arr/ aX : �X' o p t imal dam size is det ermined by set t ing ITX = O. Performing
the neces sary d if f erent iat ion , with d C/ dX = C ' (X ) , we have
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( 6 . 4 ). ffx (R/N , a ) - SrC ' (X) /N if y* � R � y** + X 
·{ -BrC ' {X) /N if R � y* 
- ctX+x R-X - · -f o SE{rr1 (-N-, a ) } -7fl (N) - SrC ' (X ) } /N if R�y**+X 
so that the third l tne of ( 6 . 4 )  d e f ines the opt imal value o f  X ,  say X* . 
Thus at the marg in ,  the d i scount ed (for t ime d i st anc e and evaporat ion 
l o s s )  expect ed ga ins from' hav ing a larger dam and s t o r ing mor e  wat er 
in the event of high run-o f f  ( i . e . , a smaller dam would mean (greater )  
wat er sp ill s )  mu st equal the marg inal annualized construct ion and 0-M 
co st s plus the marg inal opportunity c o s t  of no :: u s ing add it ionally 
stored wat er in the curr ent per iod . Since wat er users pay all c o st s ,  
we mu s t  app end ( 6 . 4 )  with the cond it ion 
( 6 . 5 ) ff (R/N , a ) J X=X* � O 
A related quest ion concern s  the eff ect o f  increa s ed investment in 
reservo ir capacity on the opt imal d iver s ion capac ity for f irms . D if f er-
ent iat ing ( 6 . 4 ) with respect to  a and solving for il a / il X ,  we f ind that
( 6 . 6 )  � = ax: 
{ O  if R � y** + X 
- ax+x Nct SE { rr1 2 (-N-, a ) } 
2 - ctX+x R-X 11 -
ct BE { Illl (-N-, a ) } + 7fll (N) - SrNC (X ) 
if R <t. y** + X 
Since a a / ilX�O investment in reservo ir capac ity and investment in d iver-
s ion capa c ity are subst itut e s  rather than compl ement s ,  as might have 
been thought . Al so from equa t ion (5 . 6 ) we can ea s ily verify that 
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( 6 . 7 )  ay:* = a2 BE{IT11 <ax;x , a ) } /ull (y1**/N) > 0 a x 
as might be expected . 
�s 7 �  
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